There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for customers located in a "social network". Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies exist in general. In the quasi-linear version of the model, NE turn out to be unique and can be precisely characterized. If there are no a priori biases between customers and firms, then there is a cut-off level above which high cost firms are blockaded at an NE, while the rest compete uniformly throughout the network.
Introduction
Consider a situation in which firms compete for customers located in a "social network". Any customer i has, of course, a higher proclivity to buy from firm α, if α lowers its price relative to those quoted by its rivals. But another, quite independent, consideration also influences i's decision. He is keen to conform to his neighbors in the network. If the bulk of them purchase firm β's product, then he is tempted to do likewise, even though β may be charging a higher price than α. Customer i's behavior thus involves a delicate balance between the "externality" exerted by his neighbors and the more classical constituents of demand -the price and the intrinsic quality of the product itself. Such externalities arise naturally in several contexts (see, e.g., [2] , [7] , [8] , [4] , [10] , [9] ).
The externality in demand clearly has significant impact on the strategic interaction between the firms. Firm α may spend resources marketing its product to i, not because α cares about i per se as a client, but because i enjoys the position of a "hub" in the social network and so wields influence on other potential clients that are of value to α. This in turn might instigate rival firms to spend further on i, since they wish to wean i away from an excessive tilt toward α; causing α to increase its outlay on i even more, unleashing yet another round of incremental expenditures on i.
The scenario invites us to model it as a non-cooperative game between the firms 1 . We take our cue from [2] , [7] which explore the optimal marketing strategy of a single firm, based on the "network value" of the customers. Our innovation is to introduce competition between several firms in this setting. The model we present is more general than that of [2] , [7] , though inspired by it. As in [2] , [7] , the social network, specifying the field of influence of each customer, is taken to be exogenous. Rival firms choose how much money to spend on each customer. For any profile of firms' strategies, we show that the externality effect stabilizes over the social network and leads to unambiguous customer-purchases. A particular instance of our game arises when firms compete for advertisement space on different web-pages in the Internet (see Section 4.2).
Our main interest is in understanding the structure of the Nash Equilibria (NE) of the game between the firms. Will they end up as regional monopolies, operating in separate parts of the network? Or will they compete fiercely throughout? Which firms will enter the fray, and which will be blockaded? And how will the money spent on a customer depend on his connectivity in the social network?
In Section 2 we describe a general non-linear model. So long as the externalities are a contraction, the strategy-to-outcome map (and thus the game) is well-defined. We show in Section 3 that NE exist in pure strategies under the standard convexity assumptions.
Section 4 specializes to the quasi-linear case (and includes the model in [2] , by setting # firms = 1). Here we prove that NE are unique and can be easily computed in polynomial time via closed-form expressions involving matrix inverses. It turns out that, provided that there are no a priori biases between firms and customers, any NE has a cut-off cost: all firms whose costs are above the cut-off are blockaded, and the rest enter the fray. Moreover there is no "regionalization" of firms in an NE: each active firm spends money on every customer-node of the social network. The money spent on node i is related to the connectivity of i, but the relation is somewhat subtle, though expressible in precise algebraic form. When externalities are dominant, however, this relation becomes more transparent: NE can be characterized in terms of the invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social network (see Section 6) . In particular suppose that the graph representing the social network is undirected and connected, all the neighbors of any customer-node exert equal influence on him, and each company values all the nodes equally. Then, at the NE, the money spent by a company on a node is proportional to the degree of the node.
In Section 5 we consider convex (rather than linear) cost functions, which include the fixed-budget case where each firm can spend freely up to an exogenously specified limit. NE need not be unique as we show via an example in Section 5.1. But if there is "sufficient competition", in that each firm has enough rivals whose characteristics are nearby, then the uniqueness of NE is restored (see Section 5.3). Uniqueness also holds if firms' valuation of clients are anonymous (see Section 5.4) , no matter how heterogenous their costs.
The General Model
There is a finite set A of firms and I of customers. We shall define a strategic game Γ among the firms. The customers themselves are non-strategic in our model and described in behavioristic terms.
Firm α ∈ A can spend m α i dollars on customer i ∈ I by way of marketing its product to him. This could represent the discounts or special warranties offered by α to i (in effect lowering, for i, the fixed price that α has quoted for its product), or free add-ons of supplementary products, or simply the money spent on advertising to i, etc. The strategy set of firm α may thus be viewed as . The proclivity of customer i to buy from any particular firm α clearly depends on the profile m, i.e., not just the expenditure of α but also that of its rivals. We denote this proclivity by p α i (m). One can think of p α i (m) as the quantity of α's product purchased by i. Or, interpreting i to be a mass of customers such as those who visit a web page i, one can think of p α i (m) as the fraction of mass i that goes to α (or, equivalently, as the probability of i going to α). In either setting, we take p i (m) ≡ (p , for β = α, can be incorporated under certain assumptions (which we make precise in Section 8.3), but for the bulk of the paper we suppose that they are absent.
By way of an example of such an externality, think of firms' products as specialized software. Then if the users with whom i frequently interfaces (i.e., i's "neighbors") have opted for α's software, it will suit i to also purchase predominantly from α in order to more smoothly interact with them. Or else suppose the firms are in an industry focused on some fashion product. Denote by i's neighbors the members of i's peer group with whom i is eager to conform. Once again, p α i is positively correlated with p α j where j is a neighbor of i. Another typical instance comes from telephony: if most of the people, who i calls, subscribe to service provider α and if α-to-α calls have superior connectivity compared with α-to-β calls, then i may have incentive to subscribe to α even if α is costlier than β.
This externality gives rise to a natural dynamic: if, at some time t ≥ 0, others' proclivities to purchase are given by q α −i (m, t) ≡ (q α j (m j , t)) j∈I\{i} , we will have q We shall suppose that the influence on i of his neighbors, albeit positive, is only partial, i.e., i puts positive weight on the money m α i that firm α offers to him and is not solely guided by the externality effect 3 . Then increasing j∈I\{i} q α j by ∆ will no doubt boost q α i , but by strictly less than ∆. We make the somewhat weaker assumption that the function F α i is a contraction, i.e., We shall ignore in this paper the transient phase of the dynamic because if q α (m, t) is viewed as a proclivity to purchase, then it will only be put into effect once it becomes stable. Would a customer buy a new car of a particular company when he is still in the process of revising his mind based on the feedback from his neighbors? On the other hand, if q α (m, t) represents actual purchases that are occurring repeatedly in small quantities, then the aggregate purchase in the steady state overwhelms the small volume traded during the very short transient phase.
In either scenario a firm need only worry about the steady state behavior of customers in evaluating its payoff. It thus seems natural to suppose that the outcome engendered by a strategy profile m is the unique fixed point p α (m) of F α (m, ·). This fully defines the map from m to p(m), and thereby the strategic game Γ between the firms.
However, at this level of abstraction, it is hard to imagine that firms can come to know the functions (F α ) α∈A . The social interaction between customers tends to be quite subtle and it is not easy for firms to generally predict the outcome with any degree of accuracy. But there are scenarios in which the interaction gets channelled through networks that are common knowledge. In particular this is possible in the wired world where the interaction may be tracked online and made explicit. (See for example [8] , [1] as well as Section 4.2.) Then (F α ) α∈A can become "manifest" to the companies, enabling them to compute the effect of the interaction, and thus to participate in the kind of game we are describing. Indeed we will focus on networks in most of our analysis.
Recall that a strategy profile m is called a Nash Equilibrium 4 (NE) of the game Γ if
for all α ∈ A (where m −α ≡ (m β ) β∈I\{α} ). It turns out that NE exist in our model under quite general conditions which we list below.
AI:
The cost function C α : R I + → R + is continuous, convex and strictly increasing 5 .
AII:
The benefit function U α : [0, 1] I → R is continuous, concave and increasing.
AIII: The externality function Our last assumption has to do with the possible discontinuity of the function
We require that, for each customer i, there be at least two distinct firms who value i, so that the competition between them will ensure that the total money spent on i is positive in any NE. The intuition is that, if m i is too small, either of the two firms could spend a "sliver" on i, which costs very little, but is nevertheless overwhelmingly more than other firms' expenditures on i, and thus is able to "buy out" i, contradicting that it has optimized. Formally, denoting by m (ii) Customer i responds to the marketing of both firms, i.e., for τ = α or τ = β,
where the lim inf is taken over sequences {m, δ} that satisfy the conditions: (m i , δ) → 0, (m To interpret the second part of AIV, take τ = α and consider a unilateral deviation by α wherein α increases m α i to m α i + δ. Since all β ∈ A\{α} have expenditures m β i on i that are vanishingly small compared to the expenditure m α i + δ made by α, firm α must have 100% of the "marketing impact" on i in the limit, on account of its deviation. On the other hand, it has less than 50% of the impact, prior to its deviation, since its expenditure is over-matched by at least one rival firm. But the jump from 50% to 100% is non-negligible since -as was said -i is not guided solely by the externality effect of his neighbors, and since the marketing impact affects his proclivities by (say) at least θ > 0. The bracketed term [. . .] is thus of the order of θ/2 and so the whole term goes to infinity like θ/2δ as δ → 0. Our assumption is weaker, allowing for the total probability of purchase across all firms by customer i to go to zero (sufficiently slowly) as the aggregate expenditure m i → 0.
We are ready to state our main existence result.
Theorem 1. Assume AI, AII, AIII, AIV. Then a Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists in the game Γ. Moreover, if m is a NE, m i > 0 for all i ∈ I.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remarks
(1) Theorem 1 remains intact (with obvious amendments in the proof) if we drop the strictly increasing property of C α and replace it by the requirement that α's expenditures must lie in a compact, convex subset
(Strictness is only used to bound the expenditures of α.) This is tantamount to taking C α to be convex and continuous on S α and −∞ on R
is continuous in m (even when m → 0) then AIV can be dropped. In need only be postulated for those i where continuity fails. Existence of NE remains intact, but now the total money spent on a client may be zero.
The Quasi-Linear Model

The Data of the Economy
We turn to a quasi-linear version of our model, which is particularly transparent, and in which NE are not only unique but can be precisely characterized. The social network now has a concrete representation in terms of a directed, weighted graph G = (I, E, w). The nodes of G are identified with the set of customers I. Each directed edge (i, j) ∈ E ≡ I × I has weights (w . In short, i's probability of purchase from different firms is simply set proportional to the money they spend on him 7 . Customer i weights the two factors (i.e., the externality impact and the marketing impact) by θ α i and 1 − θ α i , where 0 ≤ θ α i < 1. Thus, given a strategy profile m, the final steady-state proclivities of purchase
for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I. The fact that (1) has a unique solution follows, of course from our analysis of the general model, once one observes that the map (p 
Since I − Θ α W α is invertible (its row sums being less than 1), we obtain
7 More generally, γ α i (m i ) = (m α i /m i )(m i ) r where 0 ≤ r < 1. We may think of (m i ) r as the "market penetration", which rises with the total money spent. Notice p α i (m) is effectively bounded. This is so because the derivative of γ α i (w.r.t. m α i ) goes to zero as m α i → ∞, while the cost of m α i is fixed -see later -at c α i > 0, bounding m α i (and so γ α i ). (If γ α i (m i ) is to be a probability, one must amend (m i ) r to max{(m r i ), 1} or a suitably smoothed version of this function.)
It still remains to specify U α , C α and γ α i . We take U α and C α to be linear:
with u α j ≥ 0 and c α j > 0 for all j ∈ I. This gives
where u α and c α are the column vectors (u α j ) j∈I , (c α j ) j∈I and stands for the transpose operation. Denote
Then (2) may be rewritten:
Our key assumption on γ 
for fixed m i and r α i respectively. This condition reflects the diminishing returns on incremental dollars spent by α; it also states that an incremental dollar of α counts for less when α's rivals have put in more money.
We also assume that
which is the analogue of AIV in our quasi-linear world. Note that both conditions (5) and (6) are satisfied by our canonical example and its variants in footnote 8. Finally we assume that for each customer there exist at least two firms that value him:
∀i ∈ I, ∃α, α ∈ A such that : α = α and u 
An Example: Competition for Advertisement on the Web
Think of the web as a set I of pages, each of which corresponds to a distinct node of a graph. A directed arc (i, j) means that there is a link from page j to page i. At the beginning of any period, two kind of "surfers" visit page i. There are those who transit to i from other pages j in the web. Furthermore, there are "fresh arrivals", entering the web for the first time, via page i at rate ψ i .
At the end of the period, a fraction (1 − θ i ) of the population on the page i exits the web, while the remaining fraction θ i continues surfing (where 0 ≤ θ i < 1). The weight on (i, j), which we denote ω ij , gives the probability that a representative surfer, who is on page j and who continues surfing, moves on to page i (or, alternatively, the fraction of surfers on page j who transit to page i). Thus i∈I ω ij = 1 for all j ∈ I.
Companies α ∈ A compete for advertisement on the web pages. If they spend m i ≡ (m α i ) α∈A dollars to place their ads on page i, they get "visibility" (time, space) on page i in proportion to the money spent. Thus the probability that a surfer views company α's ad on page i is m
The payoff of a company is the aggregate "eyeballs" of its advertisement obtained, in the long run (i.e., in the steady state).
To compute the payoff, let us first examine the population distribution of surfers across nodes in the unique steady state of the system.
Denote by φ i denote the arrival rate of surfers (of both kinds) to page i. Then, in a steady state, we must have
for all i ∈ I. In matrix notation, this is φ = ψ + ΩΘφ where φ ≡ (φ i ) i∈I and ψ ≡ (ψ i ) i∈I are column vectors, Θ is the diagonal I × I matrix with entries θ ii = θ i , and Ω is the I × I matrix with entries ω ij . Hence
The total eyeballs (per period) obtained by company α is then
which fits the format of (4). More generally, suppose surfers have bounded recall of length k. Then firm α will only care about any surfer's eyeballs in the last k periods prior to the surfer's exit. When k = 1, α's payoff is
The expression for v α i will become complicated when the recall k > 1 (more so, if discounting of past memory is incorporated). But the payoffs in all these cases still fit the format of (4).
Generalizing in a different direction, suppose that surfers at page i, who have spent t periods in the web, exit at rate θ t i for t = 1, 2 . . .. Denote by Θ t the diagonal matrix whose ii th entry is θ t i . Then φ = (I + ΩΘ 1 + ΩΘ 2 ΩΘ 1 + . . .)ψ, which is well-defined provided we assume θ t i ≤ ∆ < 1 for some ∆ (for all t, i). This retains the format of (4) though the expression for v α i becomes even more complicated. One could also incorporate bounded recall in this setting, without departing from (4) .
Notice that the "externality" in the above examples is reflected in the movement of traffic across pages in the web. Also notice that the games derived are anonymous i.e. v α i = v i for all α. Such games will be singled out for special attention later.
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 2. Under hypotheses (5), (6) , (7), there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium in the quasi-linear model. 
Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
(12) 9 For better perspective, here is an alternative proof that m i > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that m i = 0 for some i. By assumption, there exists α such that u α i > 0. By (3),
from which it follows that [u] is being multiplied by a matrix with non negative entries and strictly positive diagonal entries. Hence v α i > 0. Let firm α unilaterally deviate from m by spending a small δ on customer i. By (4), his change in payoff is
which, using (7), becomes positive for small enough δ, contradicting that m is an NE. We conclude that m i > 0 for all i ∈ I.
10 Since m i > 0 and η i > 0, and the γ α i are differentiable away from zero, these conditions can be invoked.
In the unique NE, firms 1, . . . , k i will spend money on customer i as follows:
Firms k i + 1, . . . , n put no money on customer i. It suffices to show (ii) for α = k i + 1, since LHS of (15) = 1/m i for all α ≥ k i + 1 (on account of r α i = 0) and since RHS of (15) rises with α.
Taking l = k i + 1, and violating the inequality in (12), we obtain
which, together with (16), implies (ii). Finally, taking l = k i in (12), we have
Adding κ k i to both sides gives 
Impact of the Social Network on Nash Equilibrium
To get a better feel for Theorem 3, it might help to consider some examples.
Suppose there are five customers {1, 2, . . . , 5} and four firms {α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 }. The customers are arranged in a linear network, with i connected to i + 1 via an undirected (i.e., directed both ways) edge, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Suppose each node is equally influenced by its neighbors in the purchase of any firm's product. Thus (w . It follows from Theorem 3 that firms α 1 and α 2 will put no money on customers 4, 5 and positive money on the rest; while firms β 1 and β 2 will put no money on customers 1, 2 and positive money on the rest. In effect, there will "regionalization" of customers into α-territory {1, 2, 3} and β-territory {3, 4, 5}. The only overlap is customer 3, who is of zero direct value u γ 3 to all firms γ and yet is being equally targeted by them, purely on account of his network value.
The situation dramatically changes when the game is anonymous. Assume that there are no a priori biases between firms and customers: w α ij = w ij and θ α i = θ i for all α ∈ A and i, j ∈ I. It then follows from (3) that the game is anonymous, i.e., v At the Nash Equilibrium a subset of low-cost firms {1, . . . , k} will be active (see (12), while all the highercost firms {k + 1, . . . , n} will be blockaded, where
Each active firm α ∈ {1, . . . , k} will spend an amount m α i > 0 on all the nodes i ∈ I that is proportional to v i . Indeed, by (13), we have
β=1 c β which also shows that m α ≥ m β if α < β, i.e., lower cost firms spend more money than their higher-cost rivals. Finally, by (16), we have
c β Thus there is no regionalization of customer territory at NE, with firms operating in disjoint pieces of the social network. Instead, firms that are not blockaded, compete uniformly throughout the social network.
Uniqueness with Convex Costs
Consider the quasi-linear model but with convex, instead of linear, cost functions C α . We will no longer assume that the C α are continuous. In particular, the fixed-budget case
is admitted by us, as C α is still convex. (One may imagine here that the marketing division of each company α has been allocated a budget M α to spend freely as it likes.)
Multiple Nash Equilibria
Unfortunately it is no longer true that NE are unique. Consider the following simple fixed-budget example. There are two customers and two firms. The budgets of the two firms are identical: By straightforward algebra, we obtain
Clearly if (c 1 , c 2 ) solves(22), then so does (λc 1 , λc 2 ) for any λ > 0. So consider (22) with c 2 = 1, which yields (substituting our values for v (The reader may numerically check that η,η and η are indeed approximate solutions to (17) and (18).) Notice that the two companies have widely disparate valuations of client 2 in our counter example: v 1 2 = 500 and v 2 2 = 0.02. Curiously, if we replicate each company, the counterexample disappears and uniqueness of NE is restored. More generally uniqueness holds if, for each company there are "sufficiently many" other companies whose characteristics are "nearby"
11 . Of course the words in quotes must be made precise (which we shall do in Section 5.3).
But the counter example does show the need to impose additional constraints on the marketing functions γ α i to guarantee uniqueness of NE, a matter to which we now turn.
Uniqueness with Multi-Concavity
We shall first present an abstract result and later bring it to bear on our model. Let S α ⊂ R I + be the (closed, convex) strategy-set of α ∈ A. Given a strategy profile (m β ) β∈A ∈ × β∈A S β , suppose the payoff to any firm α depends on his action s α and the aggregate β∈A\{α} m β of others' actions. So we may take α's payoff 
Proof of Theorem 4: Let m ∈ R
I×A and η ∈ R I×A be two NE of the game. Define the matrix B = η − m. We shall show that it has no signed cell, so that by the lemma, B = 0, proving m = η.
Suppose i, α is a positive cell for B, then we have m
, we must have x > y. But this contradicts the first order conditions of NE, according to which 0 ∈ h
By a symmetric argument, B has no negative cell.
To apply Theorem 4 to our model, we focus on the case when costs are convex in total expenditure and benefits are linear, so that the payoff function may be written
(We shall refer to this in brief as "the quasi-linear model with convex costs".)
The superdifferential of −C α is clearly decreasing in m α since C α is convex. It therefore suffices to check that the superdifferential of γ 
Clearly h is strictly decreasing in m No wonder that, in the counterexample of Section 5.1, the NE were not contained in Ω.
Competition Restores Uniqueness
Throughout this section we confine ourselves to the fixed-budget model with the canonical marketing function, which was also the context of the counterexample. We shall show that, with "enough competition" no NE can be outside Ω. This will guarantee uniqueness of NE (by Corollary 1).
First consider the time-honored device of creating competition by replicating the companies, i.e., for any α, there is a replica (twin)α with identical characteristics (θ
. It suffices to show that replicas act identically in any NE, for then obviously m ∈ Ω.
We shall prove this by contradiction. Suppose m is an NE with m α = mα. Since 13 Clearly both the companies will spend all their money at any NE, since each puts positive value on at least one customer-node.
The first order conditions of NE are This establishes uniqueness of NE under replication. But it is not necessary to have exact replicas. It suffices to assume that, for each company α, there are sufficiently many rivals whose characteristics are "close enough" to those of α. (As we relax the notion of "closeness", we will need to put in more rivals.) Precisely, we have: 
Then Γ has a unique NE.
Proof. By Corollary 1, we need only verify that, if m is an NE, then m ∈ Ω, i.e., r Proof. It suffices to show that β has more money left to spend 16 on I\{i} than does α:
i.e.,
Now
14 Leading to convex costs (see the beginning of Section 5). 15 Recall that (u 
Summing over all k such that r β k > 0, we get
we must have m i ≥ M β and therefore the above inequality still holds.) This inequality along with (28), implies
On the other hand, condition (iii) says
The first-order conditions of NE imply that (25) and (26) hold, with β substituted forα. This yields
Using (ii)(b), we get k 1 k 2 ≥ 2n − 1 n which contradicts (ii)(a). We conclude that r α i ≤ 1/2 for every α and i, proving the theorem. 
Anonymous Valuations Restore Uniqueness
NE are unique even with heterogeneous convex costs and marketing functions that are more general than our canonical example, provided that companies' valuations of clients are identical: v Suppose that costs are given by differentiable and convex functions of total expenditure:
Further suppose that the marketing impact of α on i can be factored in terms of i's expenditure m α i and the total expenditure m i . AV For all α ∈ A and i ∈ I 
which gives
Similarly
From (29) and (30) we obtain
But, by (AV), LHS of (31) < 1 and RHS of (31) > 1, a contradiction.
Let η be another NE and define s 
By the convexity of the cost function and the fact that r α > s α and m ≥ η, RHS of (32) ≥ RHS of (33), so
, contradicting the last displayed inequality.
Step 3: m = η. Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g. m > η. Then there exists i such that m i > η i . Also there clearly exists α such that r α > 0. Now, consider the first order conditions (32) and (33). Since r α = s α by Step 2, RHS of (32) ≥ RHS of (33), which implies f i (η i ) ≥ f i (m i ). Thus η i ≥ m i since f i is strictly increasing by (AV). This is a contradiction.
Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply that m = η, proving Theorem 4.
Structure of Nash Equilibrium
It is natural to consider the case where the marketing impact is an anonymous function of expenditures, as in our canonical example.
for all α, β and i. Also assume that λ i is concave and increasing in m α i , as in Section 4.1. In this event, even without the factorization of AV, we can describe an interesting structural feature of NE (though we do not know if they are unique).
Recall that 
where
contradicting that λ i is increasing as in Section 4.1. The theorem now easily follows.
When Externalities become Dominant
A Markov Chain Perspective
It is often is too expensive for a firm α to provide meaningful subsidies m α i to each customer i. Indeed the marketing division of firm α is typically allocated a fixed budget M α and, if there is a large population of customers, then the individual expenditures m α i must perforce be small. In this event, customers' behavior is predominantly driven by the externality effect of their neighbors. We can capture the situation in our model by supposing that all the θ α i are close to 1. Thus we are led to inquire about the limit of the NE as the θ α i −→ 1 for all α and i. (In this scenario we will also obtain a more transparent relation between NE and the graphical structure of the social network.)
To this end -and even otherwise-it is useful to recast our model in probabilistic terms. Assume, for simplicity, that j∈I w α ij = 1 for all i and α. Let us consider a Markov chain with I as the state space and W α as the transition matrix (i.e., w α ij is the probability of going from i to j. 
, provided we assume that the probability distribution of the initial state i 0 is ξ α . Therefore the vector v α /y α is just the probability distribution of i T initializing the Markov chain at
We want to analyze the asymptotics of v α as the θ α i converge to 1 (since the unique NE of our games are determined by v α ). Let us first consider the simple case when θ α i = θ α for all i. Then the random time T becomes independent of the Markov chain and we get easily that prob(
where 1 1 i is the indicator function of i:
Recall that a sequence {a t } t∈I N of real numbers is said to i) Abel -converge to a if lim θ→1
The Frobenius theorem (see, e.g., line 11 on page 65 of [5] ) states that a Cesaro-convergent sequence is Abel-convergent to the same limit. So, to analyse the limit behavior of v α i , it is sufficient to consider the Cesaro-convergence of {1 1 i (i t )} t∈I N .
The finite state-set I of our Markov chain can be partitioned into recurrent classes I 
α,i , the Frobenius theorem implies for all α ∈ A, i ∈ I and k, k such that w ik > 0 and w ik > 0 (i.e., all the nodes connected to i have the same influence on i). Finally suppose that u α i is invariant of i for all α (i.e., each company values all clients equally), w.lo.g. u α i = 1/|I| for all α and i. Then as θ tends to 1, the money spent at NE by a company on any node is proportional to the degree of the node.
Proof: It is evident that the invariant measure is proportional to the degree. By Theorem 8, v Observing that prob(i t+1 ∈ {3, 4}|i t = i) = 1/2, when i ∈ I 0 , we conclude that, if the process starts in I 0 at time 0, then the first time τ it will reach {3, 4} is a geometric random variable with parameter 1/2: prob(τ = t) = 1/2 t , t = 1, 2, 3, . . .. As above, let S denote the index of the recurrence class of i τ . When i 0 = 1, then S = 1 whenever τ is an odd number and S = 2 otherwise. Clearly,
and thusμ α,1 = 2/3µ 
For simplicity, we also will assume that I = I α 1 , i.e., there is just one recurrent class comprising all the nodes. Proof: See the Appendix.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: Since C α is strictly increasing and convex, C α (x) → ∞ as ||x|| → ∞. Thus there exists a scalar b such that
where )) is concave and increasing in z whenever both g and G are concave and increasing.
Step 2 now follows from (37) and an obvious limiting argument.
Step 3: For > 0, define the game Γ by truncating the strategy sets to S ,α = S α ∩ {m α ∈ R 
is continuous in m and concave in m α . The existence of NE now follows from the standard Nash argument [6] .
Step 4: Let m( ) be an NE of Γ and select a subsequence n → 0 so that m( n ) → m as n → ∞. Then m is an NE of Γ.
Proof of Step 4: We need only verify that m is a point of continuity of the payoff functions. This will follow if m j = 0 for all j ∈ I. Suppose, to the contrary, m i = 0 for some i, i.e., m τ i ( n ) → 0 for all τ ∈ A. Let α and β be as in assumption (AIV). By going to a subsequence if necessary, assume m . We will show that α's gain in benefit is strictly more for small enough δ n . Let p α (−), p α (+) ∈ R I + be the probabilities achieved before and after α's unilateral deviation to the extra expenditure δ n . As shown in Step 2, p α (+) ≥ p α (−) component-wise. But, since U α is increasing, the gain in benefit is at least B[p the vector whose iα th component is δ n and all other components are 0, we have
) is non-negative by the assumption that F α i is increasing and the fact that (see Step 2) p
, is at least Kδ n where K can be chosen arbitrarily large for small enough δ n ; in particular, to ensure that BK > C α + . But then the gain in payoff is at least BKδ n which exceeds the loss C α + δ n , for small enough δ n . This shows that α can benefit from unilateral deviation at m( n ), for small enough n , contradicting that m( n ) is an NE of Γ n . We conclude that m i = 0 as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 9
It will be convenient to create a micro-model of how the decision L t ∈ {Stop, M ove} is taken in our Markov chain. Before starting the Markov chain, one can, for each state i, consider an infinite sequence of independent decisions {L
Since
Next, with [x] being the integer part of the real number x, we get
Using (34) and (36), the limit of this RHS as θ → 1 is
Similarly,
As θ goes to 1, this also converges to (39) , which therefore is also the limit of prob(i T = i).
Cross effects
We show that cross-effects (of p (It can easily be checked that our canonical example satisfies AVII.) Lemma 2. Assume that the utilities U α are concave and increasing and that AVII, AVIII hold. Then
Define
. Adding this to (40) yields
In particular, ∀i ∈ I:
and is increasing and concave, we get
Lemma 2 implies the existence of NE in the standard manner (see proof of Theorem 1).
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The key property invoked is that G be affine and α-increasing. Thus writing p Of course additional constraints need to be imposed on the w αβ ij to ensure that G is non-expansive (e.g., 0 ≤ β∈A,j∈I\{i} w αβ ij ≤ 1 will suffice).
Introduction
The scenario invites us to model it as a non-cooperative game between the firms 1 . We take our cue from [2] , [7] which explore the optimal marketing strategy of a single firm, based on the "network value" of the customers. Our innovation is to introduce competition between several firms in this setting. The model we * pradeepkdubey@yahoo.com, Center for Game Theory, Stony Brook University and Cowles Foundation, Yale University, USA † grahul@in.ibm.com, IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi, INDIA ‡ demeyer@univ-paris1.fr, PSE, Univesité Paris 1, FRANCE and Cowles Foundation, Yale University, USA § This paper incorporates and supersedes [3] 1 Customers are not strategic in our model. As in [2] , [7] , they are described in behavioristic terms.
present is more general than that of [2] , [7] , though inspired by it. As in [2] , [7] , the social network, specifying the field of influence of each customer, is taken to be exogenous. Rival firms choose how much money to spend on each customer. For any profile of firms' strategies, we show that the externality effect stabilizes over the social network and leads to unambiguous customer-purchases. A particular instance of our game arises when firms compete for advertisement space on different web-pages in the Internet (see Section 4.2). Our main interest is in understanding the structure of the Nash Equilibria (NE) of the game between the firms. Will they end up as regional monopolies, operating in separate parts of the network? Or will they compete fiercely throughout? Which firms will enter the fray, and which will be blockaded? And how will the money spent on a customer depend on his connectivity in the social network?
Section 4 specializes to the quasi-linear case (and includes the model in [2] , by setting # firms = 1). Here we prove that NE are unique and can be easily computed in polynomial time via closed-form expressions involving matrix inverses. It turns out that, provided that there are no a priori biases between firms and customers, any NE has a cut-off cost: all firms whose costs are above the cut-off are blockaded, and the rest enter the fray. Moreover there is no "regionalization" of firms in an NE: each active firm spends money on every customer-node of the social network. The money spent on node i is related to the connectivity of i, but the relation is somewhat subtle, though expressible in precise algebraic form. When externalities are dominant, however, this relation becomes more transparent: NE can be characterized in terms of the invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social network (see Section 6). In particular suppose that the graph representing the social network is undirected and connected, all the neighbors of any customer-node exert equal influence on him, and each company values all the nodes equally. Then, at the NE, the money spent by a company on a node is proportional to the degree of the node.
In Section 5 we consider convex (rather than linear) cost functions, which include the fixed-budget case where each firm can spend freely up to an exogenously specified limit. NE need not be unique as we show via an example in Section 5.1. But if there is "sufficient competition", in that each firm has enough rivals whose characteristics are nearby, then the uniqueness of NE is restored (see Section 5.3). Uniqueness also holds if firms' valuation of clients are anonymous (see Section 5.4), no matter how heterogenous their costs.
The General Model
Firm α ∈ A can spend m α i dollars on customer i ∈ I by way of marketing its product to him. This could represent the discounts or special warranties offered by α to i (in effect lowering, for i, the fixed price that α has quoted for its product), or free add-ons of supplementary products, or simply the money spent on advertising to i, etc. The strategy set of firm α may thus be viewed as . The proclivity of customer i to buy from any particular firm α clearly depends on the profile m, i.e., not just the expenditure of α but also that of its rivals. We denote this proclivity by p α i (m). One can think of p α i (m) as the quantity of α's product purchased by i. Or, interpreting i to be a mass of customers such as those who visit a web page i, one can think of p α i (m) as the fraction of mass i that goes to α (or, equivalently, as the probability of i going to α). In either setting, we take
is a quantity, there is a physical upper bound on customer i's capacity to consume which, w.l.o.g., is normalized to be 1).
The benefit to any particular firm α from its clientele p α (m) ≡ (p , for β = α, can be incorporated under certain assumptions (which we make precise in Section 8.3), but for the bulk of the paper we suppose that they are absent.
This externality gives rise to a natural dynamic: if, at some time t ≥ 0, others' proclivities to purchase are given by q We shall suppose that the influence on i of his neighbors, albeit positive, is only partial, i.e., i puts positive weight on the money m α i that firm α offers to him and is not solely guided by the externality effect 3 . Then increasing j∈I\{i} q α j by ∆ will no doubt boost q α i , but by strictly less than ∆. We make the somewhat weaker assumption that the function F α i is a contraction, i.e.,
where K < 1 and · denotes the maximum norm.
Since the F α i are contractions, this dynamic process settles very quickly (geometrically) to a steady state p α (m) (the unique fixed point fixed point of F α ≡ (F α i ) i∈I )):
We shall ignore in this paper the transient phase of the dynamic because if q α (m, t) is viewed as a proclivity to purchase, then it will only be put into effect once it becomes stable. Would a customer buy a new car of a particular company when he is still in the process of revising his mind based on the feedback from his neighbors? On the other hand, if q α (m, t) represents actual purchases that are occurring repeatedly in small quantities, then the aggregate purchase in the steady state overwhelms the small volume traded during the very short transient phase.
However, at this level of abstraction, it is hard to imagine that firms can come to know the functions (F α ) α∈A . The social interaction between customers tends to be quite subtle and it is not easy for firms to generally predict the outcome with any degree of accuracy. But there are scenarios in which the interaction gets channelled through networks that are common knowledge. In particular this is possible in the wired world where the interaction may be tracked online and made explicit. (See for example [8] ,[1] as well as Section 4.2.) Then (F α ) α∈A can become "manifest" to the companies, enabling them to compute the effect of the interaction, and thus to participate in the kind of game we are describing. Indeed we will focus on networks in most of our analysis.
AI:
The cost function C α : R Our last assumption has to do with the possible discontinuity of the function
We require that, for each customer i, there be at least two distinct firms who value i, so that the competition between them will ensure that the total money spent on i is positive in any NE. The intuition is that, if m i is too small, either of the two firms could spend a "sliver" on i, which costs very little, but is nevertheless overwhelmingly more than other firms' expenditures on i, and thus is able to "buy out" i, contradicting that it has optimized. Formally, denoting by m i + δ made by α, firm α must have 100% of the "marketing impact" on i in the limit, on account of its deviation. On the other hand, it has less than 50% of the impact, prior to its deviation, since its expenditure is over-matched by at least one rival firm. But the jump from 50% to 100% is non-negligible since -as was said -i is not guided solely by the externality effect of his neighbors, and since the marketing impact affects his proclivities by (say) at least θ > 0. The bracketed term [. . .] is thus of the order of θ/2 and so the whole term goes to infinity like θ/2δ as δ → 0. Our assumption is weaker, allowing for the total probability of purchase across all firms by customer i to go to zero (sufficiently slowly) as the aggregate expenditure m i → 0.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Remarks
The Quasi-Linear Model
The Data of the Economy
We turn to a quasi-linear version of our model, which is particularly transparent, and in which NE are not only unique but can be precisely characterized. The social network now has a concrete representation in terms of a directed, weighted graph G = (I, E, w). The nodes of G are identified with the set of customers I. Each directed edge (i, j) ∈ E ≡ I × I has weights (w . In short, i's probability of purchase from different firms is simply set proportional to the money they spend on him 7 . Customer i weights the two factors (i.e., the externality impact and the marketing impact) by θ 
Since I − Θ α W α is invertible (its row sums being less than 1), we obtain It still remains to specify U α , C α and γ α i . We take U α and C α to be linear: 
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 2. Under hypotheses (5), (6) , (7), there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium in the quasi-linear model. (9) and (10) 
Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
Impact of the Social Network on Nash Equilibrium
The situation dramatically changes when the game is anonymous. Assume that there are no a priori biases between firms and customers: w α ij = w ij and θ α i = θ i for all α ∈ A and i, j ∈ I. It then follows from (3) that the game is anonymous, i.e., v α i = v i for all α and i. To simplify the analysis, further assume: c α i = c α . Our analysis in Section 4.4 immediately implies that we can rank the firms, independently of i, by their costs; say (after relabeling)
At the Nash Equilibrium a subset of low-cost firms {1, . . . , k} will be active (see (12), while all the highercost firms {k + 1, . . . , n} will be blockaded, where
k β=1 c β Thus there is no regionalization of customer territory at NE, with firms operating in disjoint pieces of the social network. Instead, firms that are not blockaded, compete uniformly throughout the social network.
Multiple Nash Equilibria
Unfortunately it is no longer true that NE are unique. Consider the following simple fixed-budget example. There are two customers and two firms. The budgets of the two firms are identical: By straightforward algebra, we obtain (The reader may numerically check that η,η and η are indeed approximate solutions to (17) and (18).) Notice that the two companies have widely disparate valuations of client 2 in our counter example: v 1 2 = 500 and v 2 2 = 0.02. Curiously, if we replicate each company, the counterexample disappears and uniqueness of NE is restored. More generally uniqueness holds if, for each company there are "sufficiently many" other companies whose characteristics are "nearby"
Uniqueness with Multi-Concavity
We shall first present an abstract result and later bring it to bear on our model. Let S α ⊂ R I + be the (closed, convex) strategy-set of α ∈ A. Given a strategy profile (m β ) β∈A ∈ × β∈A S β , suppose the payoff to any firm α depends on his action s α and the aggregate β∈A\{α} m β of others' actions. So we may take α's payoff Π α to be defined on S α × R I + . It will be convenient to extend the domain of Π α to 11 As we expand the neighborhood of characteristics that defines "nearby", we will need to put in more companies in that neighborhood.
12 A correspondence Λ(x, y, z) is said to be decreasing in x if v ∈ Λ(x, y, z), w ∈ Λ(x , y, z), x > x together imply v ≥ w. If the last inequality is strict, we say that Λ is strictly decreasing in x. 
The superdifferential of −C α is clearly decreasing in m α since C α is convex. It therefore suffices to check that the superdifferential of γ No wonder that, in the counterexample of Section 5.1, the NE were not contained in Ω.
Competition Restores Uniqueness
First consider the time-honored device of creating competition by replicating the companies, i.e., for any α, there is a replica (twin)α with identical characteristics (θ α = θα, u α = uα, W α = Wα, M α = Mα). It suffices to show that replicas act identically in any NE, for then obviously m ∈ Ω.
Summing over all k such that r β k > 0, we get 
Structure of Nash Equilibrium
≡ λ i for all α, β and i. Also assume that λ i is concave and increasing in m α i , as in Section 4.1. In this event, even without the factorization of AV, we can describe an interesting structural feature of NE (though we do not know if they are unique).
When Externalities become Dominant
A Markov Chain Perspective
To this end -and even otherwise-it is useful to recast our model in probabilistic terms. Assume, for simplicity, that j∈I w α ij = 1 for all i and α. Let us consider a Markov chain with I as the state space and W α as the transition matrix (i.e., w α ij is the probability of going from i to j. We want to analyze the asymptotics of v α as the θ α i converge to 1 (since the unique NE of our games are determined by v α ). Let us first consider the simple case when θ α i = θ α for all i. Then the random time T becomes independent of the Markov chain and we get easily that prob(
where 1 1 i is the indicator function of i: 1 1 i (j) = 0 if j = i and 1 1 i (i) = 1.
t=0 a t = a. The Frobenius theorem (see, e.g., line 11 on page 65 of [5] ) states that a Cesaro-convergent sequence is Abel-convergent to the same limit. So, to analyse the limit behavior of v α i , it is sufficient to consider the Cesaro-convergence of {1 1 i (i t )} t∈I N .
The finite state-set I of our Markov chain can be partitioned into recurrent classes I for all α ∈ A, i ∈ I and k, k such that w ik > 0 and w ik > 0 (i.e., all the nodes connected to i have the same influence on i). Finally suppose that u α i is invariant of i for all α (i.e., each company values all clients equally), w.lo.g. u α i = 1/|I| for all α and i. Then as θ tends to 1, the money spent at NE by a company on any node is proportional to the degree of the node.
Proof: It is evident that the invariant measure is proportional to the degree. By Theorem 8, v Observing that prob(i t+1 ∈ {3, 4}|i t = i) = 1/2, when i ∈ I 0 , we conclude that, if the process starts in I 0 at time 0, then the first time τ it will reach {3, 4} is a geometric random variable with parameter 1/2: prob(τ = t) = 1/2 t , t = 1, 2, 3, . . .. As above, let S denote the index of the recurrence class of i τ . When i 0 = 1, then S = 1 whenever τ is an odd number and S = 2 otherwise. Clearly, 
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: Since C α is strictly increasing and convex, C α (x) → ∞ as ||x|| → ∞. Thus there exists a scalar b such that C α (m α ) > U α (1, 1, . . . , 1) − U α (0, 0, . . . , 0) whenever ||m α || ≥ b. Define S α = {m α ∈ R I + : ||m α || ≤ b}. Clearly, no firm α would spend more than b, for it then could be better off spending zero on every customer. W.l.o.g. we may confine α's strategies to the compact convex set S α .
Step 2: For any α ∈ A and j ∈ I, if m >> 0 then p )) is concave and increasing in z whenever both g and G are concave and increasing.
Step 3: For > 0, define the game Γ by truncating the strategy sets to S ,α = S α ∩ {m α ∈ R The existence of NE now follows from the standard Nash argument [6] .
Proof of Step 4: We need only verify that m is a point of continuity of the payoff functions. This will follow if m j = 0 for all j ∈ I. Suppose, to the contrary, m i = 0 for some i, i.e., m τ i ( n ) → 0 for all τ ∈ A. Let α and β be as in assumption (AIV). By going to a subsequence if necessary, assume m α i ( n ) ≤ m β i ( n ) for all n. Choose δ n → 0 such that δ n /m τ i ( n ) → ∞ as n → ∞, for all τ ∈ A\{α} (e.g. take δ n = max{ m τ i ( n ) : τ ∈ F \{α}). Let α spend δ n more on i. (This deviation is feasible for large enough n, since m . We will show that α's gain in benefit is strictly more for small enough δ n . Let p α (−), p α (+) ∈ R I + be the probabilities achieved before and after α's unilateral deviation to the extra expenditure δ n . As shown in Step 2, p α (+) ≥ p α (−) component-wise. But, since U α is increasing, the gain in benefit is at least B[p , is at least Kδ n where K can be chosen arbitrarily large for small enough δ n ; in particular, to ensure that BK > C α + . But then the gain in payoff is at least BKδ n which exceeds the loss C α + δ n , for small enough δ n . This shows that α can benefit from unilateral deviation at m( n ), for small enough n , contradicting that m( n ) is an NE of Γ n . We conclude that m i = 0 as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 9
It will be convenient to create a micro-model of how the decision L t ∈ {Stop, M ove} is taken in our Markov chain. Before starting the Markov chain, one can, for each state i, consider an infinite sequence of independent decisions {L 
